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Justice, truth and oral history: legislating the
past ‘from below’ in Northern Ireland




Drawing on the ‘from below’ perspective which has emerged in transitional justice scholarship and practice
over the past two decades, this article critically examines the dealing with the past debate in Northern
Ireland. The paper begins by offering an outline of  the from below perspective in the context of  post-conflict
or post-authoritarian societies which are struggling to come to terms with past violence and human rights
abuses. Having provided some of  the legal and political background to the most recent efforts to deal with
the past in Northern Ireland, it then critically examines the relevant past-related provisions of  the Stormont
House Agreement, namely the institutions which are designed to facilitate ‘justice’, truth recovery and the
establishment of  an Oral History Archive. Drawing from the political science and social movement
literature on lobbying and the ways in which interests groups may seek to influence policy, the paper then
explores the efforts of  the authors and others to contribute to the broader public debate, including through
drafting and circulating a ‘Model Bill’ on dealing with the past (reproduced elsewhere in this issue) as a
counterweight to the legislation which is required from the British government to implement the Stormont
House Agreement. The authors argue that the combination of  technical capacity, grass-roots
credibility and ‘international-savvy’ local solutions offers a framework for praxis from below in other
contexts where activists are struggling to extend ownership of  transitional justice beyond political elites. 
Keywords: transitional justice; from below; dealing with the past; legislation; truth
recovery; prosecutions; oral history.
Introduction
While transitional justice has only emerged as a recognisable field of  inquiry in the lasttwo to three decades, it has rapidly acquired all of  the elements of  what Picard2 has
termed ‘respectabilisation’. Originally viewed by many as an addendum to the study of
NILQ spring 2016
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the support of  the Arts and Humanities Council which funded the
work on which this research is based (Grant Reference AH/J013897/1), the ESRC (Grant Reference
ES/J009849/1) from which some of  the international comparative work is drawn, as well as the Queen’s
University Belfast Business Alliance Fund. In addition, we would like to thank our colleagues who worked on
the Model Bill process with us, in particular, Brian Gormally, Jeremy Hill, Daniel Holder, Louise Mallinder,
Gemma McKeown and our parliamentary draftsman Daniel Greenberg.
2 Emmanuelle Picard, ‘Une Discipline en Voie de Respectabilisation: La Germanistique Française au Milieu du
XXe Siècle’ (2002) Lendemains 68–78.
transition within political science,3 analysis of  the variants of  justice which are linked to the
shift from conflict or authoritarian rule has become a growth industry. Academics and
activists from fields as diverse as law, anthropology, international relations, philosophy,
criminology, psychology, history and many others self-identify as doing transitional justice.
As one of  the authors has argued elsewhere, there is now something of  a ‘swagger’ to the
field, not least because of  the huge amount of  monies spent on ‘top-down’ transitional
justice institutions.4 For example, retributive-focused legal institutions, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, or hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone,
East Timor or Cambodia, have spent billions of  dollars in efforts to prosecute those
deemed most responsible for past human rights violations.5 The term ‘truth commission’ is
now widely understood and utilised in everyday language and politics, including in long-
established democracies.6 Similarly, ‘rule of  law’ programmes are now a major constituent
element of  democratic reform and peace-building work – again buttressed by huge amounts
of  funding from the international donor community.7 Dealing with the past in the guise of
transitional justice is now normalised, mainstreamed and increasingly institutionalised.
In tandem with that institutionalisation of  transitional justice, for at least a decade, a
number of  scholars and activists in different transitional societies have been pressing for
a greater openness to what McEvoy and others have termed ‘transitional justice from
below’.8 The impetus for such a focus has come from a number of  places. Intellectually,
it draws from a range of  fields (including history, political science, development studies
and critical legal studies) which variously emphasise ‘from below’, ‘the subaltern’, ‘actor-
orientated’, ‘grass-roots’ or legal-pluralist understandings of  the intersection between
politics, governance and law.9 It also reflects a critical approach to whether political elites
in some transitional contexts have either the capacity or political will to come to terms
with uncomfortable truths about the past.10 Given the perhaps inevitable focus on ‘the
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3 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (first published University of
Oklahoma Press 1991).
4 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and
Praxis’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the
Struggle for Change (Hart 2008) 2.
5 William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (OUP 2012); Phillipe
Sands, From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of  International Criminal Justice (CUP 2003).
6 See Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of  Truth Commissions 2nd edn
(Routledge 2011). For example, on 2 March 2009 the New York Times ran an editorial posing the question ‘A
Truth Commission for the Bush Era?’ with regard to the actions of  US forces during the ‘War on Terror’.
President Obama ultimately concluded that such a commission should not be established. See ‘No Truth
Commission on Torture, says Obama’ Irish Times (Dublin, 25 April 2009). 
7 Christopher May, The Rule of  Law: The Common Sense of  Global Politics (Edward Elgar 2014).
8 See Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of  Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34(4)
Journal of  Law and Society 411–40.
9 See, for example, David Ludden (ed), Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the
Globalization of  South Asia (Anthem Press 2002); E P Thompson, The Making of  the English Working Class (first
published Victor Gollancz 1963); Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smyth, Globalisation From Below:
The Power of  Solidarity (Southend Press 2001); Jean-Paul Faguet, Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance
From Below in Bolivia (University of  Michigan Press 2012); Norman Long, ‘The Case for an Actor Orientated
Sociology of  Development’ in Norman Long (ed), Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives (Taylor & Francis
2001); Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of  Law (Princeton University Press 2000). 
10 Alexander Betts, ‘Should Approaches to Post-conflict Justice and Reconciliation Be Determined Globally,
Nationally or Locally?’ (2005) 17(5) European Journal of  Development Research 735–52; Paul Gready,
‘Reconceptualising Transitional Justice: Embedded and Distanced Justice’ (2005) 5(1) Conflict, Security and
Development 3–21.
rule of  law’ as a bedrock of  transitional justice, there is often a wariness of  the dominance
of  lawyers and legalism and a related unease that those who have been most affected by
violence or human rights abuses often find that their views are not heard or accorded
adequate weight once the wheels of  ‘top-down’ transitional justice processes begin to
turn.11 Indeed, in contexts where national justice systems are themselves too corrupt,
tainted, ineffective, or overwhelmed, it is frequently victims and survivor groups,
community and civil society organisations, human rights non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), church bodies and others that have done much of  the heavy lifting in pressing
for change and finding alternative or interim means of  dealing with the past.12
Transitional justice from below does not simply mean locating transitional justice at
community level. Rather, the term is increasingly used to denote the ‘resistant’, ‘corrective’
or ‘mobilising’ character of  the actions of  community, civil society and other non-state
actors in challenging hegemonic understandings of  the world or seeking to ameliorate the
consequences for vulnerable people of  the exercise of  power by elite political, social or
economic actors.13 It should also be stressed that, while the from below perspective is
generally interested in maximising community ownership and participation in processes of
justice in transition, this is not at the expense of  a suspension of  critical faculties. It certainly
does not presuppose a naive or overly romanticised notion of  community or civil society as
a place that is devoid of  reactionary or exclusionary views or practices.14 Rather, it requires
a cold-eyed and pragmatic assessment of  community risks and capacities, and the
development of  strategies which can buttress against those risks and enhance capacity. 
Finally, transitional justice ‘from below’ is not a rejectionist discourse with regard to
equivalent efforts ‘from above’. For current purposes, developing effective methods of
dealing with the past in transitional contexts is marked not simply through the
negotiations between governments and political parties. Rather it requires, imaginative
ways of  ensuring meaningful engagement in the design and implementation of
institutions by those who have been involved in the social and political struggles which
placed them on the political agenda in the first place.15 It is designed to offer, in Falk’s
terms, a different vantage point to ‘see’ more clearly how interactions, accommodations
and relationships with institutions and structures from above should evolve. It is
therefore intended to encourage and challenge those who design and implement such
institutions to improve what they do, to think more deeply about why they do it, and to
explore ways in which those same institutions of  transitional justice can broaden the
participation of  those who have been most directly affected by conflict.
The particular ‘from below’ initiative discussed in this article concerns efforts by the
authors and others to inform ongoing political and social discussions on dealing with the
past in Northern Ireland. In section one of  this article we offer a brief  overview of  the
legal and political context in which this and a related series of  interventions on the past
have developed over the past few years. We then critically assess some of  the basic
elements of  the most recent attempt to design inter-related processes that might facilitate
Justice, truth and oral history 69
11 McEvoy and McGregor (n 4); Nicola Palmer, Courts in Conflict: Interpreting the Layers of  Justice in Post-Genocide
Rwanda (OUP 2015); Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts and Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice
without Lawyers (CUP 2010).
12 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth
versus Justice (CUP 2006).
13 See, for example, Richard Falk, ‘Globalization-from-Below: An Innovative Politics of  Resistance’ in Richard
Sandbrook (ed), Civilizing Globalization: A Survival Guide (State University of  New York Press 2003).
14 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of  Community (Simon & Schuster 1994).
15 Upendra Baxi, The Future of  Human Rights (OUP 2002).
prosecutions, truth or information recovery and the creation of  an oral archive –
processes which are reflected in the proposed institutions enshrined in the Stormont
House Agreement (SHA) (2014). Finally, we reflect on our methods and seek to draw out
some broader lessons which may be applicable in other transitional contexts where civil
society or academics seek to make practical interventions. 
The political and legal context to dealing with the past 
The Good Friday Agreement (1998) contained a range of  what might be termed ‘past-
facing’ provisions concerning support for victims, prisoner release and reintegration,
policing, human rights and criminal justice reform.16 However, unlike similar peace
accords elsewhere, there was no overarching mechanism such as a truth and reconciliation
commission designed to comprehensively ‘deal with the past’. Instead, a ‘piecemeal’
approach has given rise to a smorgasbord of  institutions and techniques to deal with
particular aspects of  the conflict and its consequences. These have included: the
establishment of  a number of  public inquiries into particular controversial events,
including the killing of  13 civilians on Bloody Sunday;17 the establishment of  the Office
of  the Police Ombudsman, the responsibilities of  which include investigating both
historical and contemporary allegations of  police malfeasance;18 a series of  coronial
inquests into over 50 conflict-related deaths, many of  which occurred in controversial
circumstances;19 the establishment and ultimate disbandment of  the Historical Enquiries
Team (HET) , a police-led review of  all conflict-related deaths;20 a series of  high-profile
litigation efforts by affected families in the domestic courts and the European Court of
Human Rights;21 investigations of  alleged miscarriages of  justice by the Criminal Cases
Review Commission;22 as well as numerous community and civil society-based efforts
focused on truth recovery, story-telling, oral history and commemoration.23
In addition, there have been at least four major attempts to draw on these incremental
efforts and ‘pull it all together’ in an overarching mechanism or series of  mechanisms.
The latest initiative is outlined in detail below, but it might be useful at this juncture to
offer a brief  summary of  what is now quite a complex historical narrative, not least
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16 For an overview of  these and other elements of  the Good Friday Agreement, see special issue of  Fordham
International Law Journal (1998) 22(4).
17 See The Report of  the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Report) HC 29-I vols 1–10 (HMSO 2010).
18 For an overview of  the work of  the Police Ombudsman, see the most recent annual report:
<www.policeombudsman.org/About-Us/Publications/Annual-Reports-and-Business-Plans> accessed
14 March 2016. For the broader context see Graham Ellison, ‘A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere
in the World? Police Reform, Political Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland’ (2007) 10(3)
Police Quarterly 243-269.
19 See speech by the Lord Chief  Justice Sir Declan Morgan, ‘Review of  the Strategy for Victims and Survivors’,
Victims and Survivor Commission Conference, Belfast, 9 March 2016.
20 See Patricia Lundy, ‘Can the Past be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland’
(2009) 11 Journal of  Law and Social Challenges 109–56; ‘Exploring Home-Grown Transitional Justice and its
Dilemmas: A Case Study of  the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland’ (2009) 3 International Journal
of  Transitional Justice 321–40.
21 Gordon Anthony and Luke Moffett, ‘Northern Ireland Law, Politics and the “Problem of  the Past”’ (2014)
20(3) European Public Law 395–406.
22 Hannah Quirk, ‘Don't Mention the War: The Court of  Appeal, the Criminal Cases Review Commission and
Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland’ (2013) 76(6) Modern Law Review 949–80.
23 See, for example, Brian Gormally and Kieran McEvoy, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland ‘From Below’
(Community Foundation for Northern Ireland 2009); Kirk Simpson, Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland: Critically
Interpreting the Past (Manchester University Press 2013); Grainne Kelly, ‘Storytelling’ Audit: An Audit of  Personal
Story, Narrative and Testimony Initiatives Related to the Conflict in and about Northern Ireland (Healing Through
Remembering 2005).
because what is currently under consideration has drawn explicitly and implicitly from
previous work.
In 2006, following a two-year process of  extensive debate and deliberation with a
diverse cross-section of  opinion, the local NGO, Healing Through Remembering,
produced a major report which outlined a series of  options for dealing with the past.24
In 2007, following consultation with the Irish government, the then Labour
administration appointed the Consultative Group on the Past (CGP) to make
recommendations on how to deal with the past. The British and Irish governments were
very aware of, and directed the CGP towards, the Healing Through Remembering work
on the past in its deliberations.25 The CGP itself  made clear from the outset that it would
draw upon this previous work. As the co-chairs Lord Eames and Dennis Bradley told the
Irish News early in their consultation process, ‘organisations such as Healing Through
Remembering have already completed in-depth analysis across a range of  issues on
dealing with the past. When you take this along with the efforts of  local initiatives
undertaken by community organisations, it is clear that there is an opportunity to build
on that work.’26 Similarly, once its report was completed, the CGP was always candid that
it had not ‘started from scratch’ in conducting its work.27 Indeed, the antecedence of
some of  the key elements of  the CGP report became a focus for both supporters and
detractors, once its recommendations were made.28
Following widespread controversy concerning one recommendation that all victims of
the conflict (including the family members of  paramilitaries who were killed) should
receive a £12,000 recognition payment, that report was rejected by the Conservative-led
Coalition government which came to power in 2010. Three years later, US diplomats
Richard Haass and Megan O’Sullivan chaired negotiations involving the political parties
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24 Kieran McEvoy, Making Peace with the Past: Options for Dealing with the Past in and about Northern Ireland (Healing
Through Remembering 2006). 
25 As Minister of  State at the Department of  the Taoiseach (Deputy Tom Kitt) told the Dáil, ‘I commend to the
House the work of  Healing Through Remembering, a cross-community organisation bringing together
representatives from North and South and Britain, of  victims’ groups, churches, academics, community and
youth organisations. They have produced reports and recommendations on issues including truth recovery,
commemoration, acknowledgement and story telling. These are thoughtful and well-researched documents
that deserve careful consideration. They would serve as a very useful reference for the work of  the
Consultative Group On The Past.’ Dáil Éireann Deb, 31 January 2008, vol 645, col 730.
26 ‘Dealing with the Troubled Past is Difficult Issue for Society’ Irish News (Belfast, 2 January 2008).
27 ‘The report took account of  existing work and research undertaken into ways of  dealing with the past by a
large range of  individuals, groups, non-governmental organisations, statutory bodies and Governments. The
Consultative Group paid particular respect to the work of  Healing Through Remembering (HTR), a cross-
community project made up of  individual members from a range of  political backgrounds.’ See ‘Report of
the Consultative Group on the Past in Northern Ireland’, second report of  session 2009–10, House of
Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 6.
28 For example, Alliance Party spokesperson Stephen Farry stated: ‘We fully appreciate and welcome the Eames
Bradley Report . . . a lot of  the elements within Eames/Bradley have been trailed, for example, through
Healing Through Remembering, such as storytelling, addressing the needs of  victims, memorials, Day of
Reflection, broader reconciliation issues.’ Speech at ‘Reflecting on the Report of  the Consultative Group on
the Past Conference’, Belfast, 15 May 2009. On the other hand, in dismissing the CGP report, the prominent
Unionist victim campaigner Willie Frazer argued in a blog titled ‘Eames Bradley Quango’ that: ‘The naive
nonsense that exists at the core of  this report found its origins in the Healing Through Remembering work
which was rejected by victims. Its answer adopted by Eames Bradley is to rely on the decency of  terrorists to
come forward and tell the truth, indeed the appeasement does not end there they will be paid for their
participation – given immunity from prosecution. This is clearly a rehash of  Republican wish lists, South
African fairy tales and the wilder nonsense from the minds of  Northern Ireland great and good. But as victims
we say it is unacceptable, it is not worth the paper it is written on.’ William Frazer, 20 October 2008
<www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/archive/author.html> accessed 13 February 2016.
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in Northern Ireland which focused on a number of  outstanding issues, including dealing
with the past. Despite the negotiation of  seven successive drafts, the parties ultimately
failed to reach an agreement on the past and other matters and in December 2013 the
talks were terminated as no agreement could be reached.
In September 2014, negotiations recommenced, this time with both the British and
Irish governments more centrally involved. In December 2014, the SHA was published,
which included provisions to establish a number of  mechanisms designed to deal with the
past (detailed below). In the subsequent Queen’s speech, the UK government committed
to introducing legislation at Westminster to enact these commitments.29 In 2015, relations
within the Northern Ireland Executive deteriorated over a number of  issues, including
welfare reform, as well as austerity cuts and confirmation by the Police Service of
Northern Ireland (PSNI) that the IRA still existed following the murder of  two senior
Republicans in Belfast.30 Political negotiations recommenced in September 2015 between
the two governments and the five political parties in the Northern Ireland Executive and
eventually, in November 2015, the Fresh Start Agreement was reached.31 However, while
substantial progress was apparently made,32 no agreement on dealing with the past was
reached during these negotiations, much to the dismay of  victims across the political
spectrum.33 In the run-up to the negotiations, the British government published a
‘summary of  measures document’ offering a broad outline of  its plans and a draft
government Bill on the past was prepared.34 A leaked version of  the government’s draft
Bill (which was amended during the negotiations) contained extensive provision for the
British government to redact information deemed ‘sensitive’ from going to families
affected by the conflict on the basis of  national security (discussed further below). This
ultimately proved unacceptable to both of  the nationalist parties (Sinn Féin and the Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)) and the Irish government.35 At the time of
writing, efforts are ongoing (including by the authors and others) to seek to narrow the
gap between the different actors on the outstanding issues preventing the establishment
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29 ‘Legislation will be Taken Forward Giving Effect to the Stormont House Agreement in Northern Ireland’,
Queen’s Speech, 27 May 2015 <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015> accessed
14 February 2016.
30 ‘IRA “Army Council” Still Exists but Has “Wholly Political Focus”’, BBC NI News, 20 October 2015.
31 ‘A Fresh Start: The Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan: an Agreement to Consolidate the Peace,
Secure Stability, Enable Progress and Offer Hope’, 17 November 2015 <www.gov.uk/government/news/a-
fresh-start-for-northern-ireland> accessed 15 March 2016.
32 ‘The cross-party talks that ran from 8 September to 17 November last year, which culminated in the Fresh
Start agreement, brought us closer than ever before to consensus on the best way to deal with Northern
Ireland’s past. While we established much common ground, it was not possible to reach agreement on all
issues . . . The UK Government is determined to resolve the outstanding issues that are preventing the
establishment of  the legacy institutions set out in the Stormont House Agreement.’ Written Statement from
Secretary of  State for Northern Ireland to Parliament, 21 January 2016
<www.gov.uk/government/speeches/written-ministerial-statement-on-the-icir> accessed 13 March 2016.
33 See, for example, ‘Stormont Deal: Cross-Community Victims Group Accuses Political Leaders of  Betrayal’
Newsletter (Belfast, 18 November 2015); ‘Where is rhe Fresh Start for Victims, Leaders Asked’ Irish News
(Belfast, 19 November 2015).
34 ‘Northern Ireland (Stormont House Agreement) Bill 2015 Summary of  Measures’
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/villiers-publishes-policy-paper-on-northern-ireland-stormont-
house-agreement-bill-2015> accessed 2 March 2016.
35 ‘Britain Fails to Honour its Commitment on Truth and Justice’ An Phoblacht (Dublin, 1 December 2016); Mark
Durkan, ‘National Security Strictures Suppress Truth about Dirty War’ Derry Journal (Derry, 26 November
2015); ‘Charlie Flanagan Critical of  National Security “Smothering blanket”’ Irish News (Belfast, 27 November
2015).
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of  the various past-focused mechanisms, including a workable mechanism for dealing
with the issue of  redactions in the interest of  national security.
As noted above, the provisions on the past contained in the SHA are in reality a sort
of  palimpsest which draws upon the various proposals which have come before. As one
seasoned political commentator who has followed closely the twists and turns of  the
debate on the past for over a decade told one of  the authors in 2015: ‘there are only so
many ways of  doing this thing and God knows we have explored them all since the
Healing Through Remembering report came out in 2006’.36 The SHA commits the two
governments and the five parties in the Northern Ireland Executive to establishing four
mechanisms. These are as follows.
l Historical Investigations Unit (HIU) – an independent investigative
institution (answerable to the Policing Board of  Northern Ireland) which will
take over the past-focused work previously undertaken by the HET and the
Office of  the Police Ombudsman. This body is envisaged as having the
equivalent powers of  the PSNI in terms of  arrest, stop, search, question,
retaining evidence and so forth. Decisions regarding whether or not
sufficient evidence is available for a prosecution for conflict-related offences
will be made by the Director of  Public Prosecutions. It is required to carry
out investigations which are deemed compatible with the Article 2
requirements of  the European Convention on Human Rights.37 In addition,
where there is sufficient evidence to meet the possible threshold for
prosecution, the Director of  Public Prosecutions shall make that decision. In
addition, the HIU is required to produce a ‘victim-centred’ report to the
affected families in the case of  each of  the deaths that it investigates.38
l Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) – an
independent international body established by treaty by the UK and Irish
government. The ICIR will have an independent chair of  international
standing, as well as one other nominee each appointed by the British and
Irish governments and the First and Deputy First Ministers. The function of
this body is to allow families affected by the conflict to seek and receive
information about the circumstances surrounding the death of  their loved
ones from those who may have knowledge of  these events. In order to
facilitate those with such information coming forward, the SHA specifies
that no information provided can be used for criminal or civil proceedings.
Both governments commit to supporting any request for information from
the ICIR and its operation shall be ‘held accountable to the principles of
independence, rigour, fairness and balance, transparency and
proportionality’.39
l Oral History Archive (OHA) – this element was described in the SHA as
providing ‘a central place for people from all backgrounds (and from
throughout the UK and Ireland) to share experiences and narratives related
to the Troubles’. The SHA also stipulated that, as well as collecting new
archival material, the OHA would ‘attempt to draw together and work with
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36 Personal interview with prominent journalist, 21 October 2015. 
37 Anthony and Moffett (n 21).
38 SHA (2014), para 30 <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement> accessed 10
February 2016.
39 Ibid paras 41–50.
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existing oral history projects’. It crucially noted that: ‘The Archive will be
independent and free from political interference.’ In the subsequent leaked
draft legislation and accompanying policy document, the British government
specified that the OHA would be located within the Public Records Office
of  Northern Ireland (PRONI), albeit with ‘operational independence’ from
the Department of  Culture Arts and Leisure, the relevant parent
department.40
l Implementation and Reconciliation Group (IRG) – the work of  the IRG
will include determining a range of  themes and patterns related to the
conflict which shall be explored by a group of  appointed academic experts.41
The work of  those academics will be overseen by a group of  political
nominees, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) appointing three
members, Sinn Féin two, and the other parties which were signatories to the
Agreement appointing one each, as would the two governments – with an
independent chair of  international standing. The Agreement stipulates that
the work of  the IRG ‘should be conducted with sensitivity and rigorous
intellectual integrity, devoid of  any political interference’. The process is
designed to ‘promote reconciliation’ and a ‘better understanding of  the past’
and ‘reduce sectarianism’. It also states that: ‘In the context of  the work of
the IRG the UK and Irish Governments will consider statements of
acknowledgement and would expect others to do the same.’42
While reaching an agreement to establish these four institutions represented a significant
political achievement, the brevity of  the relevant text was such that much of  the ensuing
discussion inevitably centred on the detail of  the enabling legislation. Not for the first
time, ‘progress’ had depended on a measure of  creative ambiguity. As one of  the senior
party political negotiations told the authors, ‘. . . in reality all we could achieve in the end
were heads of  agreement’.43 Given that reality, the legislative detail was inevitably going
to be a source for additional debate and discussion amongst politicians and civil society
once negotiations recommenced in the autumn of  2015. It was in order to ensure that the
relevant political and public conversations on these often technical matters were as
informed as possible that the authors were involved with other colleagues in producing
the Model Bill on the past. That Model Bill and accompanying explanatory text are
detailed elsewhere in this issue. Before critically examining some of  the substantive
measures contained both in the leaked government legislation which appeared in 2015
and the Model Bill, it might be useful at this juncture to offer some background to the
process by which the Model Bill was produced. 
For a number of  years, McEvoy has been working closely with different civil society
organisations on aspects of  dealing with the past in Northern Ireland, most notably
Healing Through Remembering and the Committee on the Administration of  Justice. In
addition, with Mallinder and others, he has also conducted extensive international and
comparative research to explore how different jurisdictions have dealt with challenging
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40 SHA (n 38) paras 22–25.
41 Ibid para 51.
42 Ibid paras 52–54.
43 Discussion with senior political negotiator, 30 January 2015. By way of  illustration: the Healing Through
Remembering Report (2006) on options for dealing with the past was 117 pages; the report of  the CGP (2009)
contained 189 pages including appendices; the Haass–O’Sullivan (2013) document contained 19 pages on the
past; and the SHA had only five pages on the same topic.
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aspects of  the transition from conflict or authoritarianism.44 That international research
on the legal and political challenges associated with dealing with the past fed directly into
the local work in Northern Ireland.
Commencing in 2011, he led a team of  academics, lawyers and activists who (in
partnership with Healing Through Remembering) began an Arts and Humanities
Research Council-funded project designed to assist politicians, government officials, civil
society groups and others in exploring the complex interplay between prosecutions,
amnesties (and related immunities) and truth recovery in Northern Ireland. That project
engaged in an extensive range of  bilateral meetings with victims groups, ex-prisoners,
former police officers and others, as well as the British and Irish governments and all of
the political parties involved in the negotiations on the past. The team offered to provide
accurate but accessible legal and policy advice (free of  charge) to any relevant civil society
or political party interested in the dealing with the past debate. As a result, the team
produced a series of  five reports, as well as several blogs, organised a number of
conferences and seminars, and published the findings in numerous broadcast and print
media outlets.45
As the original funding came to an end in 2013, additional resources were secured
from the Queen’s University Business Alliance to support a partnership on dealing with
the past with Northern Ireland’s primary human rights NGO, the Committee on the
Administration of  Justice (CAJ). In 2015 CAJ launched its Apparatus of  Impunity report
(funded by the Business Alliance) which documented many of  the failings of  the
‘piecemeal’ approach to the past. In an effort to move beyond critiquing the status quo,
McEvoy and Bryson from Queen’s, colleagues from CAJ, along with Mallinder and
another colleague (Hill) from the Transitional Justice Institute,46 instructed parliamentary
counsel (Greenberg) and began work on producing the Model Bill on dealing with the
past and the accompanying explanatory commentary (reproduced elsewhere in this issue).
From 2014 onwards the developing drafts were discussed in the course of  more than 20
detailed face-to-face meetings with senior British and Irish officials (involved in both the
political negotiations and the preparation of  their respective legislation in either
jurisdiction on the past),47 senior politicians from across the political spectrum and a wide
range of  local civil society organisations. Drafts of  the Bill were also presented at three
major conferences organised in association with our civil society partners and the
Northern Ireland Commission for Victims and Survivors.
Once completed, the Model Bill was formally launched at an event at the House of
Lords sponsored by former Northern Ireland Office Minister Lord Dubbs in October
2015 and addressed by Shadow Northern Ireland Secretary of  State Vernon Coker,
amongst others. It was also widely publicised through the local print and broadcast media,
at a further conference in Belfast, and a range of  seminars and briefings aimed at civil
society organisations and political parties.
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Northern Ireland’ (1998) 8(1) International Criminal Justice Review 33–61; Kieran McEvoy and Louise
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46 Jeremy Hill is now a visiting scholar at the Transitional Justice Institute. He is a former senior Foreign and
Commonwealth Office lawyer, a former UK ambassador and served as the legal advisor to the CGP.
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Our approach in drafting and disseminating the Model Bill was to stick closely to the
text of  the SHA and to write the substantive sections in a manner that was consistent with
UK domestic law and the relevant international human rights standards. The Model Bill
was very explicitly not a ‘wish list’ document. From the outset, we were very aware that
its efficacy as an advocacy tool depended upon its technical competence and our
collective credibility in delivering it, and related policy outputs, in as measured,
constructive and informed a fashion as possible.48 The detailed explanations of  the text
in the Model Bill are outlined in the ‘Clause by clause’ article published elsewhere in this
issue. In this paper we have attempted to place the work on the Model Bill in its broader
legal and political context. In particular, we will now examine how those involved sought:
to frame discussions on the workability of  the various mechanisms proposed in the SHA
in the light of  past experiences of  analogous institutions both locally and internationally;
to manage the expectations of  affected parties, in particular victims of  the conflict; and
to have a close eye on what would be required politically to maximise public confidence
in the institutions. Below, we have grouped the primary issues around which the efforts
to deal with the past in Northern Ireland have coalesced – namely, the potential for
conflict-related prosecutions; the opportunities for truth or information recovery (both
about specific events and broader patterns and themes of  the conflict); and the role of
archives and story-telling in capturing people’s lived experiences during the conflict.
Prosecutions, ‘justice’ and disclosure
In many transitional contexts, the struggle for ‘justice’ is often viewed as synonymous
with the efforts to investigate and prosecute those who were responsible for previous acts
of  murder, torture and other human rights violations. The importance of  individual
accountability, deterrence, bringing some ‘satisfaction’ to victims, embedding human
rights and the rule of  law and symbolic marking of  the wrongness of  past actions are
amongst the compelling rationales offered for pursuing past prosecutions.49 In the
Northern Ireland context, a determination to retain the possibility of  prosecutions for
conflict-related offences has been a constant theme in political negotiations on dealing
with the past – usually expressed most strongly by the Unionist political parties and
victims’ groups from that community.50 The political reality is that the ‘focus on dealing
with the past is ensuring robust criminal prosecutions are in place to pursue justice’ has
been a fundamental prerequisite for Unionist negotiators throughout the transition.51 The
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48 For a discussion on the relationship between credibility and effective advocacy, see Bertram J Levine, The Art
of  Lobbying: Building Trust and Selling Policy (CQ Press 2008); John C Scott, The Social Process of  Lobbying
(Routledge 2014).
49 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (WW Norton
2011).
50 Cheryl Lawther, Truth, Denial and Transition; Northern Ireland and the Contested Past (Routledge 2013).
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2013). The SDLP and to a lesser extent Sinn Féin have also continued to advocate for prosecutions of  state
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(Belfast, 11 November 2015).
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vehicle for achieving that objective has been the police-led work of  the HET and its
successor envisaged under the SHA, the HIU. 
Informed by the political reality that ‘the justice option’ had to be kept on the table,
much of  our policy and practical work interventions on the issue have been directed
towards helping to manage the expectations of  victims regarding the potential for
conflict-related convictions. In the policing and legal community, there is a widespread
acceptance that the very significant practical and evidential challenges associated with
securing convictions for historical offences (many of  which happened decades ago) mean
that very few convictions will in reality be secured.52 Indeed, since the signing of  the
Good Friday Agreement in 1998 there have only been four successful prosecutions of
non-state actors (two Loyalist and two Republican) for pre-1998 conflict-related murders
or attempted murders and none of  state actors.53 Moreover, under the terms of  the Good
Friday Agreement, anyone convicted of  a conflict-related offence will serve a maximum
of  two years regardless of  the seriousness of  the offence.54 Thus, our approach to
working on the HIU has been to ensure that these realities remain at the forefront of  the
public conversation while simultaneously emphasising the truth recovery potential of  the
proposed mechanism. 
When the HET was established it had a number of  specified objectives to guide its
work. Interestingly, the first of  the three specified objectives of  the HET was to ‘assist in
bringing a measure of  resolution’ to the families of  victims killed during the conflict
between 1968 and 1998.55 The key output designed to deliver this measure of  resolution
was the Review Summary Report about the circumstances of  the death of  their loved one
delivered to families. Mindful of  legal and ethical responsibilities,56 the HET committed
to a policy of  ‘maximum permissible disclosure, consistent with legal constraints’.57 For
the vast majority of  cases reviewed by the HET (and if  the SHA is implemented, its
successor, the HIU), it is these reports to families which will be the most important product
of  the work of  those investigations.
As is discussed in more detail in the ‘Clause by clause’ article, we considered that the
key elements to maximise the effectiveness of  the HIU to deliver such products were to
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of  Official Limitations on Post-Agreement Investigative Mechanisms’ (Committee on the Administration of
Justice 2015) ii.
54 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (s 10, ‘Accelerated release’).
55 The other specified objectives were to re-examine all ‘troubles related’ deaths ‘in a manner that satisfies the
PSNI’s obligation to conduct an effective investigation’ and to do so in a way that commands the confidence
of  the wider public. PSNI HET Operational Guide 2013, para 2:1.
56 For example, the Regulation of  Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which makes it a criminal offence to name an
informant and contains obligations to protect lives under Article 2 European Convention on Human Rights.
57 See Lundy (n 20).
ensure that it is independent, properly resourced, suitably staffed (including with
reference to gender) and sufficiently empowered – particularly with regard to the
disclosure of  documents and other materials. As has been well documented, one of  the
key failings of  the HET when it was in operation was its practical inability to ensure that
former members of  the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) did not compromise the
independence of  investigations into historical cases where state malfeasance (including by
the RUC) was a constituent part of  the investigation.58 Our proposed solution to this
issue was to adopt a similar position to the Office of  the Police Ombudsman regarding
legacy cases and to disbar former RUC or British Army members (or indeed those with
an affiliation to paramilitary organisations or their linked political parties) from
employment by the HIU. On the issue of  resourcing, we sought to ensure that the HIU
could not be subject to financial manipulation or general austerity measures by specifying
that the UK Treasury should determine the HIU’s budget and that it must be paid out of
the Consolidated Fund – which would mean that in practice its budget could only be
changed by a relevant vote in Parliament. With regard to disclosure, the formulation in
the Model Bill was that other public authorities had an unfettered duty of  disclosure in
response to a request by the HIU for documentation requested in conducting its
investigations. With regard to the onward disclosure to families by the HIU in the
subsequent reports, the Model Bill suggested that the HIU Director may omit
information if  it might put a person’s life at risk or if  it might prejudice the administration
of  justice (e.g. interfere with a potential successful prosecution). 
As noted above, this final issue regarding the disclosure powers of  the HIU became
the key stumbling block which apparently prevented an agreement being reached in late
2014. After political negotiations had recommenced in the autumn of  2015, a leaked
version of  the government’s draft legislation on dealing with the past in Northern Ireland
came into the public arena. Amongst the most notable elements of  that leaked draft were
the provisions relating to disclosure and the HIU. While the powers of  disclosure of
information including intelligence to the HIU to assist it in conducting investigations were
quite strong, the HIU’s ability to provide ‘onward disclosure’ of  such information to
families was significantly curtailed by numerous references to powers that the Secretary
of  State could exercise to redact information on ‘the grounds of  national security’ – a
term that was not included in the Stormont House Agreement. As noted above, from the
outset Sinn Féin and the SDLP (and latterly the Irish government and the Alliance Party)
all criticised the British government for attempting to use a ‘national security veto’ to
undermine the truth recovery functions of  the HIU.59 While none of  the political actors
have contested the responsibility to redact information that might put individuals’ lives at
risk (the version favoured in the Model Bill), difficulties in assessing which other
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legitimate national security interests might be redacted and the decision-making process
for making such redactions have continued to prove difficult to resolve. Since the political
negotiations failed to reach agreement, the authors and other civil society actors have
been working through a range of  possible solutions. Drawing upon the relevant UK and
European Court of  Human Rights jurisprudence, and best practice in other transitional
justice contexts, we have been examining the criteria by which such redactions could be
made, the shape of  an independent judicial decision which could determine the
reasonableness of  any such redactions, and the ways in which the respective interests of
the state and affected families might be legally represented in coming to such a
determination.60 That work is ongoing at the time of  writing. 
In sum, the drafting of  the Model Bill and related policy and research work before and
since has sought to engage with the technical challenges associated with legislating for an
investigative mechanism which has both a prosecutorial and a truth recovery function.
Debates around the meaning and purpose of  justice in post-conflict and post-
authoritarian contexts are quite commonplace. As the field has evolved, differing shades
of  emphasis on retributive, restorative, transformative and other iterations of  justice
often map onto particular institutions such as trials, truth commissions, reparations
programmes and so forth.61 What is less common, however, is the institutionalisation of
both retribution and restorative measures in the same mechanism. The HIU and its
predecessor the HET are an adaptation of  police ‘cold case review’ investigative
techniques now well established in many settled democracies. However, that adaptation
has been applied to a post-conflict context where the mechanism is designed to provide
the possibility of  both prosecutions and truth recovery and where the state which is
designing the mechanism (and, of  course, the former police force, the RUC) was a direct
protagonist in the conflict. Little wonder that reaching political agreement on the relevant
legislation has proved such a formidable challenge.
TrUTh, ‘INforMATIoN reTrIevAL’ ANd IMMUNITy
In addition to the justice-focused elements to transitional justice, scholarship and praxis in
the field has been focused since at least the 1980s on the notion of  truth recovery as a key
component to dealing with past violence and human rights abuses.62 The efforts at truth
recovery in a number of  Latin-American jurisdictions including Argentina, Chile,
Guatemala and others were most famously incorporated into the South-African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) established in 1995.63 Over 40 truth commissions
have been established since the Argentinian Commission on Disappearances was set up in
1983 and variants on the mechanism have emerged in recent years in settings as diverse as
Sierra Leone (2000), Canada (2009), Brazil (2011) and Sri Lanka (2015).64 The rationales
for doing truth recovery usually include: the rights of  affected families and survivors to
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61 See, for example, Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2002); Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena (n 12); Kerry
Clamp (ed), Restorative Justice in Transition (Routledge, 2013); Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional
to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice’ (2014) 8(3) International Journal of  Transitional
Justice 339–61.
62 Hayner (n 6). 
63 Richard A Wilson, The Politics of  Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State (CUP
2001).
64 Hayner (n 6); International Centre on Transitional Justice, Drafting a Truth Commission Mandate: A Practical Tool
(2013); ‘Sri Lanka to Set Up a South Africa Style Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ The Guardian (London,
15 September 2015). 
79
know (sometimes referred to as the ‘right to truth’); the establishment of  an authoritative
public record; challenging cultures of  denial and impunity; and, particularly since the
SATRC institutionalised the linkage, encouraging personal, communal and social
reconciliation.65 In addition, truth commission or equivalent truth recovery mechanisms
are often framed as either an alternative to retributive trials or in some cases as a
complementary measure – a recognition that punishing all of  those guilty of  past atrocities
through the courts is often practically impossible.66 Each of  these elements have featured
to varying degrees in the debates on dealing with the past in Northern Ireland.
Much of  the truth or truths about the conflict in Northern Ireland which have been
revealed to date have come from the various piecemeal mechanisms discussed above.67
Amongst the various efforts to devise an overarching approach to the past, one can
discern a clear shift in the political language. In the 2006 Healing Through Remembering
document, one of  the options explored was the establishment of  a ‘Truth Recovery
Commission’. In 2009, the CGP recommended the establishment of  a ‘Legacy
Commission’, key tasks of  which were to establish truth and ‘information recovery’.68
The CGP further stipulated that the processes of  investigation, information recovery
with regard to individual cases, and the examination of  larger ‘themes’ in the conflict
would come under the purview of  the proposed Legacy Commission.69 In 2013, the final
version of  the Haass–O’Sullivan text which ultimately failed to reach agreement included
provisions for the establishment of  an Independent Commission for Information
Retrieval (ICIR) with no mention of  a ‘truth recovery’ function. The Haass–O’Sullivan
document also contained a commitment that the ICIR ‘will also establish an internal unit
to analyse patterns or themes . . . to understand context and contribute to public
awareness of  history both now and for subsequent generations’.70 As noted above, the
ICIR was retained in the SHA ‘to enable victims and survivors to seek and privately
receive information about the (Troubles related) deaths of  their next of  kin’.71 However,
in the negotiations which led to the SHA, the ‘big picture’ analysis was decoupled from
the ICIR and that responsibility was given to a new mechanism, the IRG, ‘to oversee
themes, archives and information recovery’.72 The word ‘truth’ does not appear anywhere
in the SHA.
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The lack of  emphasis on truth recovery in the evolution of  the dealing with the past
mechanisms is of  interest. Of  course, there is a plethora of  literature which offers strong
critiques of  the very notion of  truth and highlights the particular challenges of  truth
recovery in post-conflict contexts where memory wars remain a key political and
ideological battleground.73 A certain intellectual wariness about the viability of  truth
recovery in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, is quite commonplace. More immediate,
however, is the reality that, in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin has long called for an
international truth commission (specifically referencing the South-African example) and
the SDLP has historically called for a similar mechanism designed to ensure a ‘robust
truth process’.74 Unionists, on the other hand, have long expressed cynicism about
whether such truth recovery will ever happen and, instead, have continuously asserted
their determination to prevent ‘the rewriting of  history’ by Republicans.75 In short, the
gradual reduction to zero of  discussion on truth recovery and its replacement by
information retrieval and information recovery reflects increased buy-in by Unionist
politicians in the process of  dealing with the past.
Our work on the truth or information recovery aspects of  this process has been
across a number of  areas, in addition to the HIU discussed above. With regard to the now
decoupled mechanism (the IRG) to deal with the broader themes of  the conflict, the
political shape of  the compromises made during the Stormont House negotiations on
this new institution were very obvious once the text was released. As noted above, the
SHA stipulated that the IRG would be overseen by a body of  11 people, all of  them
political appointees by the local parties and the two governments.76 This body would
commission a report on themes from independent academic experts. The SHA also
stipulated that the work of  the IRG should ‘be conducted with sensitivity, and rigorous
intellectual integrity, devoid of  any political interference’.77
As detailed in the ‘Clause by clause’ article, our concern in drafting the Model Bill was
therefore to write clauses which maximised the independence of  this mechanism.
Towards that end, we suggested that it too (like the HIU) should be a body corporate;
included some criteria on the qualities and skills of  the kind of  people who should be
appointed to the IRG; imposed a statutory duty on members to act independently and
impartially; and suggested provisions on reporting and relations with the other bodies.
After the failed negotiations of  2014 recommenced in autumn 2015, most of  our energies
were channelled into public and private lobbying that the IRG should actually be included
in the enabling Westminster legislation after the British government made it clear that it
considered that inclusion of  the IRG in the primary legislation was not required. It is our
understanding that this point, also argued strongly by a number of  the political parties
and the Irish government, was ultimately conceded in those negotiations and that the IRG
will be included in Westminster legislation, although significant details have not been
resolved at the time of  writing. 
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The other vehicle for truth and information recovery in the SHA is the ICIR. A key
challenge of  this or any equivalent body is how to encourage those with information which
may be of  relevance to victims to come forward. As was noted above, this was a specific
issue upon which members of  the team had been working for many years. In 2007, a
detailed report on the issue was submitted to the CGP.78 Internationally, much of  these
kinds of  discussions are framed as the ‘truth recovery in return for amnesty trade-off ’.79 It
is also true that elements of  the Northern Ireland transition can be accurately described as
amnesties or amnesty-like measures.80 However, in contributing to the Haass–O’Sullivan
and Stormont House negotiations, the team ultimately decided to emphasise the
longstanding British legal tradition of  using limited immunities from prosecution in public
inquiries and related investigations into past events rather than pressing for the more
contentious term of  amnesties.81 In 2013, a proposal submitted from the project team on
ways of  trading truth recovery for different forms of  immunity from prosecution was
adapted by the parties and is contained in the final draft agreement presented by Haass and
O’Sullivan. It was retained in slightly amended form in the SHA 2014.82
In working on the Model Bill, again we sought to ensure the independence and
effectiveness of  the ICIR: suggesting that it should be a body corporate; specifying a
range of  victims and survivors who would be able to access its services; and suggesting
that the Secretary of  State make regulations to require public authorities to provide it with
information. In addition, we included a clear statement that ‘information provided to the
ICIR is not admissible as evidence in criminal or civil legal proceedings’. We also included
a requirement for regulations that a person providing information should also not be
subject to ‘administrative sanctions’ (e.g. to protect a state employee from disciplinary
proceedings), as well as the power to create offences for people knowingly providing false
information, obstructing the work of  the ICIR (including public authorities destroying
information likely to be required by the ICIR), or disclosure of  information by its
members or staff. In addition, because the ICIR will have a cross-border dimension and
require the completion of  an international treaty between the two governments, we
included a schedule to our Model Bill with suggested text for that Agreement. 
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When the leaked version of  the UK government legislation became public in late
2015, the inadmissibility of  information given to the ICIR for criminal or civil
proceedings was confirmed. However, similar to our concerns with regard to the HIU,
analogous provisions which required the ICIR to pass copies of  the reports (which were
due to go families) first to the British and Irish governments to review for ‘national
security’ reasons became the primary focus of  our concerns. At the time of  writing,
those concerns remain.
oral history, story-telling and the past
The final element of  the Model Bill and SHA mosaic for dealing with the past in
Northern Ireland is the OHA. As with the other elements of  the SHA, versions of  this
mechanism have been trailed in previous rounds of  negotiation. As early as 1998, the
report into victims and survivors commissioned by the then Secretary of  State Mo
Mowlam highlighted ‘the value of  “telling the story”’.83 The CGP provided much fuller
detail on the potential role for story-telling, recognising its potentially ‘cathartic nature’ in
enabling people to share their stories with others (especially their former enemies). They
envisaged a role for the chair of  the Legacy Commission, through a Reconciliation
Forum, to promote story-telling schemes and memorial projects and further
recommended the collation of  stories in some form of  archive.84 Similarly, the
Haass–O’Sullivan document recommended that the Northern Ireland Executive should
establish ‘an archive for conflict-related oral histories, documents and other relevant
materials’ for those who ‘wish to share their experiences connected with the conflict’.
That report, like the SHA, also stipulated that this archive ‘will be free from political
interference’ and, in addition to collecting new material, will function as a repository for
existing oral history archives.85
The ancient art of  story-telling has long since been overtaken by technology, but the
central imperative to listen in a measured, humane and respectful fashion continues to
underscore the modern oral historian’s craft.86 Often juxtaposed to the overly legalistic
and costly nature of  other transitional justice mechanisms (such as trials or truth
recovery bodies), advocates highlight the particular appeal of  oral history and story-
telling approaches in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings.87 This includes the
possibility of  ‘giving voice’ to marginalised, victimised and ‘subaltern’ witnesses and of
broadening the canvas for dealing with the past. Thus, neglected themes such as rural
experiences of  conflict, the intersection of  class struggles, mental health and
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generational shifts can be examined.88 In addition, oral history provides a platform to
explore the gendered dimensions of  conflict, providing ‘under the radar’ opportunities
to document difficult and sensitive issues concerning domestic violence and other
gender-based harms.89 Affording space for the complex, contradictory and sometimes
inchoate nature of  individual experience also creates important opportunities for victims
and survivors to tell their stories in full and in context, at a time and place that best suits
their needs.90
In the Northern Ireland context, many existing oral history projects have set out to:
amplify ‘unheard voices’; provide a counterbalance to official narratives; offer some form
of  redress for victims and survivors; underscore advocacy and community action; and
share lessons with other societies.91 In many ways, the ‘piecemeal’ nature of  efforts to
deal with the past discussed above increases the significance of  this type of  work.92 In
the absence of  an overarching truth mechanism, academic and community oral history
and story-telling projects in Northern Ireland have provided some of  the few available
options for those who want to have their experiences and their consequences recorded
and acknowledged.93 The WAVE Trauma Centre victims’ group, for example, has
developed a range of  story-telling projects to capture the experience of  those who were
either bereaved or injured as a result of  the conflict.94 Other projects have concentrated
on the experience of  specific communities, particularly those most affected by the
conflict.95 Former combatants, in particular, Republican ex-prisoners, have worked
collectively to coordinate the story of  their prison experiences and to link this to
outreach, reconciliation and support work.96 Significant impetus was injected into the
sector by the European Union’s Peace III Programme which funded dozens of  oral
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history and story-telling projects.97 In view of  the participatory nature of  the method, it
is not surprising that a number of  academic-led oral history projects have been predicated
on community engagement and cooperation.98 In keeping with the international trend,
some of  the most powerful work has developed at the interface of  oral testimony and the
arts. Outputs here include ‘theatres of  witness’ and interview-based plays and novels.99
In light of  the plethora of  local oral history projects and expertise and the long-
standing need to provide a central repository for accounts of  the conflict, the SHA
(correctly in our view) stipulated that ‘as well as collecting new material, this archive will
attempt to draw together and work with existing oral history projects’.100 In our work on
the Model Bill, we thus began our deliberations by focusing on how the OHA might
complement and facilitate existing groups and organisations. At an early stage in our
consultations it became clear that many existing projects feared what might be described
as a ‘Tesco’ or ‘Walmart’ effect, i.e. that a new central archive would challenge and
ultimately threaten their existence. Others expressed concerns that, in the absence of
proactive and fulsome engagement with existing groups, the new archive would inevitably
run the risk of  repeating the mistakes of  the past. To allay these concerns, it was clear
that the governance model would have to reflect the need to ensure good and mutually
productive relations with existing organisations. As with other aspects of  the Model Bill
process, we drew upon best practice elsewhere – in particular looking at models employed
by organisations such as the Digital Public Library of  America and the Royal Irish
Academy, as well as local umbrella groups, such as Healing Through Remembering.101
As is detailed further in the ‘Clause by clause’ article, the governance structure we
ultimately settled on proposed that the Public Records Office of  Northern Ireland
(PRONI) – subject to the necessary checks and balances – could function as the shell for
the proposed OHA. Crucially, however, we included provisions to give the OHA
statutory independence. It would be established by the First and Deputy First Ministers,
acting jointly, and governed by three executive directors (one of  whom would be
appointed in consultation with the Dublin government). In addition, we suggested that a
strong and diverse Advisory Board (provided for in statute) would represent the interests
of  existing oral history projects and networks and would assist the Executive Board with
the development of  strategy and policy, objectives and priorities. We also included
provisions to enable this board to oversee complaints, financial regulation and the
submission of  reports to the IRG. The day-to-day work (research, outreach, interviewing,
archiving and administrative support) would be undertaken by a Secretariat and the
necessary skills and attributes for all office-holders were set out in some detail in the
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Model Bill. In addition, to ensure adherence to international best practice, we made
provision for a detailed Code of  Practice (with particular guidelines for work with specific
groups, such as victims and young people). We also proposed a central ‘training the
trainers’ model as a cost-effective way of  enabling the OHA to operate with as much
flexibility and reach as possible. To avoid a narrow and inward-looking approach, we
tailored the governance structure to ensure meaningful participation and input from
agencies and victims and survivors ‘throughout the UK and Ireland’.102 Finally, in the
drafting of  the Model Bill, and our related policy work and engagement with stakeholders,
we were concerned to counter the apparent assumption (which appeared to be shared by
some politicians and officials) that the OHA could be largely passive in enabling people
from ‘throughout the UK and Ireland’ to participate and contribute. Based on our own
previous experience, we argued strongly that ensuring participation from a suitably broad
range of  victims and others demanded careful anticipation, consultation, outreach,
reflection and persuasion.103
Other than the governance and outreach functions of  the OHA, the obvious practical
challenge which has overshadowed our own work and that of  the officials working on the
legislation has been the ‘fear factor’ associated with the Boston College Tapes project.
Commencing in 2001, a prominent journalist, Ed Moloney, and two researchers,
interviewed approximately 40 former members of  Republican and Loyalist paramilitary
organisations on behalf  of  Boston College, with the proviso that their interviews would
not be made public until after their death. Public attention was drawn to the archive
following the publication of  two of  the interviews (with recently deceased interviewees),
in a book and documentary, and by media coverage of  an exchange with one of  the
interviewees which suggested that the tapes contained information about some of  the
most notorious crimes of  the Troubles. The British government (on behalf  of  the PSNI)
subsequently contacted the US Department of  Justice requesting (under the terms of  the
UK–US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) to subpoena ‘any and all interviews’ containing
information about the murder of  Jean McConville. In December 2011, Judge William
Young ruled against both Boston College and the project researchers and ordered that the
relevant material be handed over, a decision that was upheld by a three-judge US Federal
Appeal Court in July 2012. A number of  high-profile political activists were subsequently
arrested, including senior loyalists, veteran Republican Ivor Bell and the President of  Sinn
Féin, Gerry Adams, who was subsequently released without charge.104
This controversy underlined in the sharpest possible terms that, under current
legislation, oral history archives cannot offer a cast-iron guarantee of  confidentiality. We
proposed to address this by emphasising the need for training on issues of  ethical and
legal probity and by stating clearly that the OHA would not accept information about
crimes that had not been processed and fully determined by the courts of  all relevant
jurisdictions. At the same time, we recognised the danger of  the OHA becoming overlaid
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by an excessively bureaucratic and legalistic approach.105 We also acknowledged that one
of  the unfortunate legacies of  the Boston College Tapes project is that many oral history
projects (however innocuous or apolitical) have become uneasy about depositing their
materials with archives. To mitigate the possibility of  the OHA becoming an anodyne
repository of  ‘safe’ and unchallenging narratives, we proposed that the Data Protection
Acts and the Freedom of  Information Act 2000 should not apply to material deposited
with the proposed archive until such times as accounts have been published (i.e. reviewed
by contributors and approved for release by the appropriate staff  members). This is not
designed to encourage information about material that could be deemed defamatory or
otherwise controversial. Rather, it simply acknowledges the considerable sensitivity of
‘experiences and narratives related to the Troubles’ and the need to encourage and
facilitate as wide a range of  contributions as possible. Whilst contributions to the archive
should, for the most part, be accessible online, we also proposed that opportunities
should be provided for people to hear and share their respective stories in a central,
inclusive and welcoming space.
Such assurances arguably amount to very little unless the fundamental issue of  trust,
or what we describe here as ‘grass-roots credibility’, is addressed. This speaks to a core
stipulation set out in the SHA that the archive ‘will be independent and free from
political interference’. At an early point in the negotiations on the outworking of  the
SHA, the PRONI was invited to scope out various options for the development of  the
OHA. With the tacit agreement of  the five main political parties, this quickly solidified
into a proposal that the proposed archive should be under the charge and
superintendence of  the Deputy Keeper of  PRONI. As PRONI is an executive agency
of  the Department of  Culture, Arts and Leisure, this immediately raised concerns for us
and others about its independence. Those who have attempted to develop sensitive
cross-community projects know all too well that political interference is to be avoided at
all costs.106 Suggestions that the Deputy Keeper would have ‘operational independence’
from his/her keeper (the prevailing minister) in respect of  the OHA did little to allay
fears.107 The issue of  ministerial control of  documents is but one element of  a much
wider conundrum. Operational independence is well and good in theory but, in light of
organisational impulses and constraints, it is difficult to envisage a career civil servant
closing his or her ears to the clearly expressed wishes of  their direct minister. And, at
any rate, the proposal to entrust to the Deputy Keeper all power to control and direct
the OHA, including decisions about which records to include and which to destroy and
if, how and when to engage ‘expert practitioners’, remains highly problematic.
Discussions with politicians and policy-makers on these and related issues concerning
the OHA are ongoing at the time of  writing. 
In summary, like others involved in these discussions, we have long since been
persuaded of  the short and long-term need for an effective overarching strategy for oral
history, story-telling and the conflict. What future generations make of  the conflict in
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Northern Ireland will be significantly swayed by the source material we bequeath to
them.108 What is missing from official documentation on the proposed OHA is any hint
of  a vision. Articulation of  such a vision demands careful reflection on complex
concepts, such as reconciliation, victimisation, truth and reconciliation; reflections that
will in turn inform the acquisitions and preservation policy – the essential contours of  the
mechanism. Cast in the right mould, the OHA could make a valuable contribution to the
process of  dealing with the past and, ultimately, to reconciliation. Past experience dictates
that grasping the nettle of  reconciliation requires long-term vision and a departure from
penny-wise, pound-foolish approaches. If  there is a silver lining to the recent failure to
agree a legislative framework for dealing with the past, it is that the various opportunities
and challenges outlined here might be debated more fully before institutional and legal
parameters are set in stone. 
conclusion
At the time of  writing, the authors and our colleagues on the Model Bill team are still
working intently with officials from both governments, as well as other political and civil
society actors, to overcome the remaining obstacles to finally ‘deal with the past’ in
Northern Ireland. There is a widespread agreement that we are ‘closer than ever
before’109 and we are confident that, with political will and some legal imagination, these
remaining obstacles are resolvable. However, given the fact that they are yet to be
resolved, it is perhaps too early to be overly definitive about the lessons to be learned
from the Model Bill process and the related policy and advocacy work which has preceded
and accompanied this project. By definition therefore, these conclusions must at this
stage remain somewhat tentative. With such caveats duly noted, we would suggest that
there are at least three overlapping themes which emerge which may be of  interest to
activists seeking to influence transitional justice processes ‘from below’ elsewhere. These
can be summarised as technical capacity, grass-roots credibility and providing ‘international-savvy’
local solutions. 
Both governments, other civil society organisations and a number of  the political
actors involved have publicly acknowledged the value and worth of  the technical
contribution of  the project to date at various conferences, seminars and events. For
example, in a letter to our project partner, the Committee on the Administration of
Justice, the current Under-Secretary of  State for Northern Ireland said: 
I would like to acknowledge the input that you and others have brought to the
shadow bill project, and I know my officials have found this to be a useful and
innovative way of  engaging in parallel with the development of  the Bill. In
addition the events and workshops which you have hosted have facilitated the
expression of  the views of  stakeholders on these important issues.110
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Drafting legislation is by definition a complex and specialist undertaking. As in other
contexts,111 having what Binderkrantz has referred to as ‘technical insight’ has
undoubtedly afforded the team access and influence with key players.112 As Beyers,
Weiller and Brandli and others have argued, such technical expertise may be particularly
valued by policy-makers, officials and other who are working in complex and sensitive
areas.113 Indeed, precisely because of  the politically sensitive and legally complex issues
involved, an ‘institutional opportunity structure’114 existed for the provision of  measured,
detailed and technically sound interventions. Nothwithstanding inevitable disagreements
on policy and principle, the ability to ‘speak the same language’ on the technical aspects
of  the debate helped create a variant of  an ‘epistemic community’ between the Model Bill
team and government officials.115
However, the process has involved much more than the provision of  technical
information. In reviewing the relevant literature on political and policy advocacy, we have
arguably been involved in both ‘insider tactics’ (e.g. engaging with the political actors and
government officials) and ‘outsider tactics’ (e.g. a sustained campaign of  media and civil
society engagement).116 Queen’s Law School and its Human Rights Centre, in particular,
together with the Transitional Justice Institute at Ulster University, have a significant
reputation for their commitment to making an impact in the ‘real world’. Notwithstanding
those profiles, we would argue that the partnership with the Committee on the
Administration of  Justice (Northern Ireland’s primary human rights NGO) on the Model
Bill process and with Healing Through Remembering (the jurisdiction’s primary ‘dealing
with the past’ NGO) on the broader truth recovery, immunities and oral history work was
crucial in emphasising that this was ‘not just an academic exercise’ for those involved. 
Equally critical has been the team’s openness to applying international knowledge and
experience to the local. As Nelken has argued, one of  the key advantages of  comparative
legal scholarship is not only that it allows us to ‘make sense of  difference’, but that it also
allows us to move beyond the essentialising tendencies of  our own context and to
consider and present local problems in a different light.117 For some audiences, the team’s
ability to draw upon international law (in particular, the jurisprudence of  the European
Convention on Human Rights), as well as transitional policy and practice elsewhere, was
a clear advantage. However, as evidenced with the interventions concerning the truth and
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immunity debate discussed above, in other contexts such knowledge and experience was
probably less persuasive than British public law policy and practice. As is evidenced by the
design of  all of  the past-focused institutions in the SHA, ‘bespoke local solutions’ (in
some instances clearly influenced by international experience whether or not this was
expressly articulated) were required in order to reach political consensus.
Over a quarter of  a century ago, the legendary sociologist Stan Cohen wrote
compellingly about the difficult balancing act for academics between their natural
intellectual scepticism and their moral and political obligations to try to make a difference,
to ‘engage’.118 Given the difficulties associated with dealing with the past in Northern
Ireland over the past two decades, we would be lying if  we didn’t admit that there have
been times when we have been beyond frustration at the inability of  our politicians to ‘do
the deal’ on the issue. Needless to say, our frustrations are as nothing compared to those
of  the victims and survivors who were directly affected by the conflict.119 The Model Bill
process and related work has presented us with a classic ‘window of  opportunity’ in
political terms where three elements came together: a complex series of  problems; the
opportunity to develop and refine proposals to address those problems; and the
possibility of  political change.120 Regardless of  the ultimate outcome, the process of
engagement has been a privilege. 
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